Survivability is the capability of a system to provide its services in a timely manner even after intrusion and compromise occur. In this paper, we focus on the quantitative analysis of survivability of virtual machine (VM) based intrusion tolerant system in the presence of Byzantine failures due to malicious attacks. Intrusion tolerant system has the ability of a system to continuously provide correct services even if the system is intruded. This paper introduces a scheme of the intrusion tolerant system with virtualization, and derives the success probability for one request by a Markov chain under the environment where VMs have been intruded due to a security hole by malicious attacks. Finally, in numerical experiments, we evaluate the performance of VM-based intrusion tolerant system from the viewpoint of survivability. key words: intrusion tolerant system, byzantine failure, virtualization, survivability, Markov model 
Introduction
In recent years, computer system faces the threat of intrusion due to malicious attacks that exploit security holes or vulnerabilities. Typically, these attacks are caused by malicious codes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and attack scripts. Since security holes and vulnerabilities are essentially software bugs, they can be detected and removed in system testing. However, system and applications are released while their security holes or vulnerabilities still remain in practice, even if developers carefully execute system testing. In fact, the number of security incidents is increasing as the software system is used in wide application area.
In general, the attributes of security are categorized to confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The system is evaluated with CIA criteria from the viewpoint of security, and highly-secure system should be designed to keep high levels of these criteria. Although there exist many types of security incidents such as website defacement and deny-ofservice (DoS) attack, all of them are related to CIA. In general, the security failure is defined by the system failure that causes the degradation of CIA. This paper focuses on the intrusion as a typical security failure that is a main cause of degradation of confidentiality and integrity in the system.
The intrusion is regarded as a Byzantine failure of system. The Byzantine failure is defined as an arbitrary failure, namely, a process with Byzantine failure causes deviation from its normal behavior created by an algorithm [1] . To counteract the intrusion, we need to take care of every actions by a failed and intruded process such as sending fake messages, not sending any messages, and disrupting other processes. Security solutions such as intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, and firewalls are designed to protect against the malicious attacks [2] . However, these solutions are not always possible to prevent all kinds of attacks. For example, intrusion detection systems require the signatures of attacks that have been reported. Thus it is difficult to prevent the intrusion completely. Therefore, to ensure that systems are correctly and safely available even in the presence of intrusion, it is necessary to develop a mechanism to tolerate intrusions.
Intrusion tolerance is the ability of a system to continuously provide correct, but possibly degraded, services even if the system is intruded [3] . In the past, some of researches on intrusion tolerance were based on Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) techniques in distributed computing. Zhao [4] presented the implementation of service infrastructures with intrusion tolerance based on BFT techniques in Web services providers. Also, Merideth et al. [5] proposed a BFT middleware system by extending the existing BFT and Web services technologies to provide a structured way to build Byzantine-fault-tolerant, and survivable Web services that application developers can use like other Web services.
Concretely, these researches were based on the state machine replication (SMR) [6] , where each service replica runs on a different physical machine. Moreover, to tolerate f Byzantine failures, the total number of replicas should be greater than or equal to 3 f + 1. That is, the system resources required for BFT system are not so low.
Recently, several researchers pay attention to virtualization technology to build more trusted computing environments. The virtualization is to create software components that emulate the behavior of hardware or other software components on a software platform. The most popular virtualization architecture, called the hypervisor, is to provide virtual machines (VMs) that behave actual computers on the software platform. OpenStack, VMware, Xen, and Hyper-V are typical platforms that can provide the hypervisor. In virtualized computing environments, attackers search for exploitable security holes or vulnerabilities in deployed virtualization environments to compromise one of its software processes. The common attack patterns are virtualized botnets, virtual code injection attacks, and hypervisor traverCopyright c 2015 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers sal attacks [7] .
Junior et al. [8] proposed a shared memory based intrusion tolerant system in which each service replica runs in a different VM and the communication among the replicas is performed through an abstraction of a shared memory. In this system, the required number of replicas (VMs) is reduced from 3 f + 1 to 2 f + 1. Moreover, Lau et al. [9] considered a similar approach to [8] . Concretely, they described the algorithms for processing requests sent by clients in the presence of malicious attacks and succeeded to reduce the minimum number of replicas to f + 1 by using an agreement service that provides a voting process and puts a signature into an agreed response. However, once Byzantine failure occurs, 2 f + 1 VMs are needed. Thus there is the situation where Lau's method is very wasteful, and it has not been clear what situation Lau's method functioned well.
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of Lau's VM-based intrusion tolerant system. In particular, this paper focuses on survivability of system in the presence of intrusion. The survivability is the capability of a system to provide its services in a timely manner even after intrusion and compromise occur [10] . For intrusion tolerant systems, the survivability is an important attribute, because it evaluates behavior of the system after it has been intruded. Concretely, this paper considers an extended intrusion tolerance scheme which includes Lau's VM-based intrusion tolerant system, and build a stochastic model by a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC). Based on the model, we compute two system performance indices: the success probability for one request from clients under malicious attacks, and the conditional success probability provided that the system has been intruded. The latter is a survivability metric to evaluate the system ability to mask the intrusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the behavior of VM-based intrusion tolerant system presented by Lau et al. [9] . In particular, we present a generalized scheme which extends Lau's method. In Sect. 3, we build a DTMC model based on the model behavior described in Sect. 2. Also, we formulate the success probability for one request under malicious attacks, and the conditional success probability survivability metric in terms of success probability. Section 4 is devoted to numerical experiments. Concretely, for four different cases on the number of initially activated VMs, we evaluate the success probabilities, discuss the survivability, and consider the effects of model parameter of VM-based intrusion tolerant system. Finally, we conclude this paper with some remarks in Sect. 5.
VM-Based Intrusion Tolerant System
Consider the intrusion tolerant system in the virtualized environment [9] as shown in Fig. 1 . In the system, we suppose that there are n (≥ 2) virtual machines (VMs) and component agreement service (AS) running on a hypervisor. The VMs provide identical services to clients. The communication among VMs is performed through a shared memory in the physical host where any VMs can read and store values. The AS provides a voting process and puts a signature into an agreed response, is kept isolated, and assumed to be reliable in the system. When the system receives a request from a client, the request is copied and sent to all the VMs. Each of the VMs processes the request independently and sends the response to AS. After receiving all the responses from all VMs, AS votes to make a final response based on all the responses, and puts a signature into the final response, then sends it to the client.
If all the VMs are normal (not intruded), all the responses are identical. Thus it is possible to make the agreement of the final response in AS. However, VMs are likely to be maliciously intruded when processing requests. In general, intruded VMs can be regarded as VMs with Byzantine failures. In other words, we cannot forecast the behavior of intruded VMs. Even in such case, AS can make the agreement when the number of intruded VMs is less than n/2. Let f be the tolerance level, namely, the maximum number of intruded VMs that are tolerated to the extent that the system behaves normal. From the argument of Byzantine fault tolerance, the inequalities n ≥ 2 f + 1 and f ≤ (n − 1)/2, hold.
Lau et al. [9] proposed a scheme of intrusion tolerance with two rounds of processing. Their idea is to achieve the tolerance level f at the second round of processing. On the other hand, to save resource usage in the system, the number of VMs is reduced at the first round. Concretely, for a given tolerance level f , they assumed that f + 1 VMs were initially activated, and f + 1 VMs process a request at the first round. In their scheme, AS can make the agreement after finishing all the processes in VMs at the first round if and only if the following two conditions hold; (i) all the VMs have sent responses to AS and (ii) all of the responses are coincident. It should be noted that the tolerance level at the first round in Lau's scheme is 0, i.e., no intrusion is tolerated at the first round. If the agreement is not made, AS resends the request to VMs including already-intruded VMs, at the second round after activating f suspended VMs. At the second round, AS makes the agreement by a majority voting, i.e., AS makes the agreement when at least f + 1 responses from VMs are coincident. At that time, the tolerance level f is achieved in the system.
Lau's scheme can be extended from two points. One is to allow to assign arbitrary integers to the numbers of initially and additionally activated VMs. In Lau's scheme, since the tolerance level at the first round is f = 0, the minimum number of initially activated VMs is n = 2. In this case, the number of additionally activated VMs after the first round is r = 2 f − 1. From the viewpoint of resource usage, this configuration seems to be better than the original one.
Another point is to allow to use 3 or more rounds for the agreement. In Lau's scheme, the tolerance level is fixed as f . However, if the agreement was not made at the second round, it would be better to make the agreement as the tolerance level increases at the third round. According to these two points, this paper considers a generalized scheme including Lau's scheme. Concretely, AS try to make the agreement within m rounds using n initially activated VMs and r additionally activated VMs at each round. In this case, the maximum tolerance level of system is given by n + r(m − 1) = 2 f + 1 and f = n + r(m − 1) − 1 /2. In addition, we allow that AS can make the agreement at the first round if the number of intruded VMs is less than n/2, i.e., the tolerance level at the first round is f = n/2 which is more severe than f = n + r(m − 1) − 1 /2. That is, in the generalized scheme, the intrusion tolerance is varied with respect to the round and it becomes relaxed as the number of rounds increases.
We illustrate the behavior of the system achieved by the generalized scheme with n = 3 and r = 2 for one request in Fig. 2 . Suppose that the number of initially activated VMs is 3, denoted by VM1, VM2, and VM3. All the VMs are normal when the system receives a request form a client. The request is copied and sent to all the VMs, then each of the VMs processes the request independently and sends the response to AS. Then AS votes to make the agreement based on all the responses. As seen in the figure, the system is failed to process the request (i.e., the agreement is failed) at the first round because VM1 and VM3 are intruded by malicious attacks (the number of normal VM (VM2) < the number of intruded VMs (VM1 and VM3)). Thus two VMs are additionally activated and the request is sent to all the VMs. All the VMs continually process the request, and AS achieved the agreement at the second round (the number of normal VMs (VM2, VM4, and VM5) > the number of intruded VMs (VM1 and VM3)), that is, the request processing is succeeded, and a final response will be sent to the client. If AS cannot get the majority of normal VMs, new VMs will be activated, then the request will be processed at the third round. Note that, after sending the response to the client, all the VMs are initialized and the number of VMs becomes n = 3 again. Also, the security failure occurs when AS cannot make the agreement even at the m-th round.
Survivability Analysis

Formulation of Success Probability
In this paper, we focus on the success probability for one request under the environment where VMs may be intruded due to malicious attacks by exploiting security holes of system. The success probability is the probability that one request is processed within the maximum number of rounds under malicious attacks. For notational convenience, n k is the number of VMs at the k-th round. Also f k is the tolerance level at the k-th round. They are given by
and
respectively. Suppose that the intrusion occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival rate λ (> 0) for each VM, namely, the failure rate of each VM is λ. Also let S be the processing time for a request in one VM which is an independent and identically distributed nonnegative random variable having the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) G(t). Then the probability that a VM is intruded during it processes one request is given by
where G * (λ) is the Laplace-Stieltjes transform [11] of G(t). For example, when G(t) is a gamma distribution with mean a/b and standard deviation √ a/b, the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the gamma distribution can be defined as follows,
where
By applying the Laplace-Stieltjes transform, we obtain
Thus in this case, we can compute the probability that a VM is intruded when processing one request by
Let N k be the number of normal VMs at the end of the kth round. Since the number of normal VMs is the number of VMs that are not intruded, the probability mass function (p.m.f.) of N 1 is given by
In the second and later round, the number of normal VMs depends on the number of normal VMs at the end of the previous round. Since r VMs are additionally activated when the number of normal VMs is less than n k−1 − f k−1 , the conditional p.m.f. is given by
for x = 0, . . . , r + y and y = 0, . . . ,
According to the above probabilities, the discrete-time process {N k ; k ≥ 1} can be regarded as a discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) with the state transition probability as in Eq. (9) . Note that the state space of the DTMC is defined by {0, . . . , n k − f k − 1} because the agreement is succeeded when the number of normal VMs becomes greater than or equal to n k − f k and that the state space depends on the number of rounds. Let π k be the probability vector at the end of the k-th round. Then we have
and the (i, j)-element of transition matrix P k−1 is given by
Also the i-th element of the initial vector π 1 is given by
Since the state space changes at each round, it should be noted that P k is not a square matrix. It is assumed that the maximum number of rounds is m, because of the lack of the resources on the physical machine to maintain many virtual machines. Therefore, in the worst-case scenario, the total number of VMs needed to increase to n 1 + r(m − 1) at the last round. The tolerance level of the system is n 1 +r(m−1)−1 2 , defined as f m . That is, the system is able to tolerate maximally f m Byzantine failures under malicious attacks. Moreover, the success probability for one request under malicious attack condition becomes
where e is the column vector whose elements are all 1.
Survivability Metric
As mentioned before, the survivability is the capability of a system to provide its services in a timely manner even after intrusion and compromise occur. It has been quantified by using multidimensional Markov chains to consider simultaneous failures [12] . In this paper, we define the survivability metric as the conditional success probability for one request provided that the agreement is failed at the first round. It can be obtained as follows.
where the i-th element of the initial vectorπ 1 is given by
Numerical Illustration
In this section, we evaluate the success probabilities for one request and discuss the survivability of VM-based intrusion tolerant system. Suppose that the failure (intrusion) rate of one VM is given by 10 times per hour, i.e., λ = 1/360000[1/ms]. In addition, the distribution for the processing time for a request in one VM is assumed to be the gamma distribution with mean 100 and standard deviation 50 √ 2. The p.d.f. of the gamma distribution is defined as
where a = 2, and b = 1/50. Therefore, the probability that a VM is intruded when it processes one request can be computed by using Eq. (7). Suppose that the number of initially activated VMs, n 1 , Table 1 Success probabilities with respect to n 1 and m in the case of r = 1. varies from 2 to 5. If the agreement is failed due to some intruded VMs, AS tries to do it at the next round, and r VMs are additionally activated to continually process the request, in this paper, we consider two situations of the number of VMs which is additionally activated at the next round, that is, r = 1 and r = 2. Besides, we consider the cases where the maximum number of rounds is m = 2, 3, 4.
Success Probability
This section illustrates the success probabilities for four different cases. Tables 1 and 2 show the success probabilities for the respective number of initially activated VMs and m rounds when r = 1 and r = 2, respectively. These tables indicate that the success probabilities become higher as the maximum number of rounds increases. However, as seen in Table 1 , when r = 1, i.e., the number of additionally activated VMs is 1, there is the case where the success probability cannot be improved even if the number of rounds increases by one. For example, in the case of r = 1 and n 1 = 2, the success probability of m = 2 is the same as the probability of m = 3. Similarly, in the case of r = 1 and n 1 = 3, the success probabilities of m = 1 and m = 2 are identically 0.9999997686578. This is caused by the fact that there is the case where the intrusion tolerance level does not increase even if r increases by one in Eq. (2). On the other hand, by comparing Table 2 with Table 1 , we find that the success probability monotonically increases when r = 2. Next we investigate the success probabilities with respect to the number of initially activated VMs n 1 . From Tables 1 and 2 , we find that there are the cases where the success probability decreases even though n 1 increases. Remarkably, in the case of r = 2, the success probabilities with n 1 = 4 are less than those with n 1 = 3 for m = 1, 2, 3. This result is not intuitive. The reasons are twofold; (i) the intrusion tolerance level with n 1 = 3 is the same as the one with n 1 = 4 in the case of r = 2; (ii) the risk of intrusion is higher as the number of VMs is larger. That is, in the case of r = 2, although the intrusion tolerance levels with n 1 = 3 and n 1 = 4 are the same, the intrusion risk of n 1 = 4 is higher than that of n 1 = 3. As a result, the success probability is degraded in the case of n 1 = 4. In fact, by looking at the success probabilities in the even numbers of initially activated VMs, n 1 = 2, 4, we find that they monotonically increase because the tolerance level surely increases. The same result appears in the odd numbers of initially activated VMs. As shown before, in the case of r = 1, since there are the cases where the tolerance level does not increase as the number of rounds increases, such degradation of success probabilities with respect to n 1 appears only in the cases of m = 1 and m = 3. Finally we compare the success probabilities under Lau's scheme and the generalized scheme. In this experiment, the intrusion tolerance levels in both schemes are set as f = 3. Then under Lau's scheme, the numbers of initially and additionally activated VMs are n = 4 and r = 3, respectively. On the other hand, to achieve the same tolerance level at the maximum number of rounds m = 3, we set n 1 = 3 and r = 2 under the generalized scheme. Table 3 shows the success probabilities for one request under Lau's and generalized schemes. The last column in the table indicates the success probability at the first round. From the table, it can be seen that the success probabilities under Lau's and generalized schemes are almost the same, but the success probability at the first round under the generalized scheme is much higher than that under Lau's scheme. This implies that the generalized scheme more rarely goes to the second round, and thus the generalized scheme is expected to be more effective to reduce resource usage than Lau's scheme.
Survivability Analysis
In this section, we discuss the survivability of VM-based intrusion tolerant system under the generalized scheme. More precisely, we consider the survivability in terms of the conditional success probabilityp s under the environment where the agreement is failed at the first round. In general, in the intrusion tolerance scheme, the number of intruded VMs at the first round is unknown even when AS does not make the agreement at the first round, but the number of intruded VMs (alternatively, the number of normal VMs at the end of the first round) strongly affects the conditional success probability in the later rounds. First we consider the case where the number of normal VMs at the end of the first round is known. Let N 1 be the number of normal VMs at the end of the first round. It has possible values N 1 = 0, . . . , n 1 − f 1 − 1 where f 1 is the tolerance level at the first round given by Eq. (2). Tables 4 and 5 present the conditional success probabilities for all the possible values of N 1 when m = 2, 3, 4 and r = 1, 2. Note that the conditional success probability is exactly 0 when there is no possible to obtain the majority of normal VMs at the end of the m-th round. Similar to the case of success probability, from Table 4 , it is found that there are the cases where the conditional probabilities do not increase with respect to m in the case of r = 1. On the other hand, in the case of r = 2, the conditional success probabilities monotonically increase as the number of rounds becomes large. Also, there are the cases where the conditional success probabilities decrease with the number of initially activated VMs due to the tolerance level and the risk of intrusion.
Next we consider the case where the number of normal VMs is unknown. The conditional success probabilities can be computed by using the initial vector of Eq. (16). Tables 6  and 7 present the conditional success probabilitiesp s in the cases of m = 2, 3, 4 and r = 1, 2. Compared to the success probabilities in Tables 1 and 2 , the conditional success probabilities become smaller, because the conditional success probability considers the situation where some VMs have already been intruded at the first round. Moreover, in the case of r = 2, the conditional success probability becomes higher as the number of rounds increases. This implies that it is important to check the conditional success probability as well as the success probability to enhance the survivability when the intrusion tolerance system is designed. On the other hand, we find that the conditional success probability does not increase monotonically even if we focus only on the even numbers of n 1 . For example, in the case of r = 2, the conditional success probabilities with n 1 = 4 are smaller than those with n 1 = 2. This result is remarkable in the case of survivability analysis of intrusion tolerance system, and also the same result is found when we focus on the odd numbers of n 1 . When the agreement is failed at the first round, the number of intruded VMs is proportional to the number of initially activated VMs. In addition, under the situation where the number of intruded VMs is large, it is difficult to make the agreement even if several VMs are additionally activated. That is, from the viewpoint of survivability, the small number of initially activated VMs is better. Finally, we compare Lau's and generalized schemes in terms of conditional success probability. According to the same setting in the previous section, we compute the conditional success probabilities under Lau's and generalized schemes (see Table 8 ). From the table, the conditional success probability under Lau's scheme is higher than that under the generalized scheme. It is the evidence that the ability to tolerate the intrusion at the second round is high under Lau's scheme. Therefore, it is important to choose the scheme based on the purpose of system. Moreover, we investigate the sensitivity of r on the success probability p s and conditional success probabilityp s . Table 9 shows the success probabilities and conditional success probabilities with respect to r = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 in the case of n 1 = 3 and m = 2. Similar to the results on n 1 , both suc- cess probability and conditional success probability do not increase monotonically with respect to r. When we focus on the even numbers of r, they monotonically increase due to the characteristics of tolerance level. In the case of the odd numbers of r, we can conclude the same remark.
Parameter Effects
Finally, we consider the effects of failure rate of VM on the success probability and conditional success probability in the situation where the number of initially activated VMs, n 1 , is 3, and the maximum number of rounds, m, is 3. For the activation number of VMs, we assume that r = 1 and r = 2, respectively as previously mentioned. Also we suppose that the failure rate of one VM, λ, varies from 1 to 100 times per hour, i.e., λ varies from 1/3600000 [ Figures 3 and 4 show the effects of the failure of VM on the success probabilities and conditional success probabilities in the case of r = 1 and r = 2, respectively. From Fig. 3 , we can see that the success probability in the case of r = 1 is quite high, and almost equal to the success probability in the case of r = 2 when the failure rate of VM is less than 0.000014 × 3600000 = 50 times per hour. When the failure rate increases and becomes higher than 50 times per hour, the success probability in the case of r = 2 is almost unchanged and sufficiently high. However, the success probability in the case of r = 1 decreases as the failure rate increases. In Fig. 4 , we find that the conditional success probability in the case of r = 1 decreases rapidly when the failure rate increases. On the other hand, the conditional Effects of VM failure rate on the success probability and conditional success probability in the case of r = 1.
Fig. 6
Effects of VM failure rate on the success probability and conditional success probability in the case of r = 2. success probability in the case of r = 2 does not change much. These figures imply that any change in the failure rate of VM has a great impact on the success probability for one request in the case of r = 1. However, activating 2 VMs at the next round has a large effect on the improvement of the success probability which have been validated by comparing Table 1 with Table 2, or Table 6 with Table 7 .
The effects of the failure rate of VM on the success probability and conditional success probability in both of two cases are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. From Fig. 5 , it is observed that the conditional success probability decreases rapidly when the failure rate increases. This indicates that any change in the failure rate of VM also has a great impact on the conditional success probabilityp s . Therefore, to improve the conditional success probability, the most efficient way is to decrease the failure rate of VM. However, the curve for the success probability implies that any change in the failure rate has less effect on the success probability of VM-based intrusion tolerant system. The same conclusions can also be obtained from Fig. 6 . As seen in Fig. 6 , it is found that both of the success probability and conditional success probability in the case of r = 2 become high by the comparison to Fig. 5 with r = 1. Moreover, the main difference between two figures is that, the conditional success probability in the case of r = 2 decreases slowly as the failure rate increases, compared to the curve for the conditional success probability in the case of r = 1.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have dealt with survivability quantification of VM-based intrusion tolerant system proposed by Lau et al. [9] . Concretely, we presented the generalized scheme which is extended from Lau's scheme, and built a DTMCbased stochastic model from the system behavior. We then formulated the success probability for one request, and the conditional success probability provided that the agreement is failed at the first round as a survivability metric. In numerical experiments, we have investigated the characteristics of success probability and conditional success probability under both Lau's and generalized schemes. As a result, their performance cannot be evaluated only by the tolerance level. In addition, we have investigated the situation where the success probability and the conditional success probability are degraded even though the number of activated VMs increases. Also, we have found that the generalized scheme is superior to the reduction of resource usage and the enhancement of success probability, and that Lau's scheme has high survivability.
In this paper, we have evaluated only the success probability for one request. In practice, compared to the system without intrusion tolerance, the response time of intrusion tolerance system tends to be long, because AS waits for all the responses from VMs to make the agreement. In future, we will evaluate the system performance in terms of response time by using a queueing analysis. In addition, applying security patches is essentially important to prevent the intrusion as well as a general security failure. Thus we will also evaluate the performance in terms of availability under a certain maintenance policy such as patch management.
